3-2003

Are County Officials Liable for Forcibly Executing a Search
Warrant Against a Sovereign Indian Tribe
John P. LaVelle
University of New Mexico - School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John P. LaVelle, Are County Officials Liable for Forcibly Executing a Search Warrant Against a Sovereign
Indian Tribe, Preview U.S. Supreme Court Cases 368 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/573

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the UNM School of Law at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

RI G H T S

INDIAN

Are County Officials Liable for Forcibly
Executing aSearch Warrant Against
a Sovereign Indian Tribe?
by John P LaVelle
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 368-374. © 2003 American Bar Association.

John P. LaVelle is an associate
professor of law at the University
of New Mexico School of Law, the
author of "Rescuing PahaSapa:
Achieving Environmental Justice
by Restoring the Great Grasslands
and Returning the Sacred Black
Hills to the Great Sioux Nation," 5
Great PlainsNaturalResources
Journal 40 (2001), and a member
of the executive committee of the
board of editors that is revising
Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of
FederalIndian Law, which will be
published in 2004. He can be
reached at (505) 277-0951 or
lavelle@law.unm.edu.

ISSUE
Are county officials liable for
entering tribal land on an Indian
reservation and seizing a sovereign
Indian tribe's personnel records in
the course of executing a search
warrant stemming from allegations
that individual tribal members
employed by the tribe committed
welfare fraud?
FACTS
On February 14, 2000, the managing personnel of the Paiute Palace
Casino, a tribally chartered gaming
enterprise owned by the Bishop
Paiute Tribe and located on tribally
owned land within the boundaries of
the Bishop Paiute Reservation in
southern California, received a letter from the office of the district
attorney of Inyo County requesting

the records of three employees-all
members of the tribe-suspected of
fraudulently receiving state welfare
payments in excess of their eligibility. An attorney for the tribe
informed the county district attorney that under longstanding tribal
policy the records could not be
released unless the employees in
question gave their written consent.
Thereafter a peace officer from the
county district attorney's office filed
an affidavit in Inyo County Superior
Court asserting probable cause to
believe the three individuals fraudulently had received state welfare
benefits. The county superior court
issued a search warrant on March
23, 2000, authorizing search of the
casino premises for the limited purpose of permitting the county officials to obtain payroll records for
the three employees.
Later that same day, the Inyo
County district attorney and the
county sheriff entered the casino
premises to execute the search warrant. Despite tribal officials' protest
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that the state did not have jurisdiction to enforce a search warrant
against a sovereign Indian tribe, the
county officials proceeded to use
deadbolt cutters to cut the locks off
a secured facility near the casino in
which the tribe's confidential personnel records were stored. The
county officials seized time card
entries, payroll registers, and payroll check stubs as well as quarterly
payroll tax information that the
tribe previously had submitted to
the State of California pursuant to a
tribal-state compact negotiated in
compliance with the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et
seq. The documents seized contained confidential information concerning the three individuals named
in the warrant as well as 78 other
tribal members employed by the
casino. Notwithstanding the search
warrant's limited scope, the county
officials did not permit the tribe to
redact information not specified or
identified by the terms and conditions of the warrant. Charges
against all three individuals named
in the warrant subsequently were
dropped for lack of probable cause.
Four months later, the county district attorney sent the tribe another
letter requesting the personnel
records for six additional tribal
members employed at the casino
during the period July 1999 through
July 2000. Replying to the request,
the tribe's attorney informed the
county district attorney that the
tribe was willing to provide the
records without protest if the county would supply the tribe with a
redacted copy of the last page of the
signed county welfare application
for each of the six individuals in
question. For the tribe, these signatures constituted evidence of the
individuals' consent to release of the
information sought by the county,
since the signatures indicated that
the employment records of welfare
assistance applicants were subject

to review by county officials.
Although honoring the tribe's
request would have allowed the
county to obtain all the information
it sought without forcing a breach of
tribal policy, the district attorney
refused to accept the condition.
On August 4, 2000, the tribe filed a
complaint in federal district court
against the county district attorney
and county sheriff in their individual and official capacities, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief as
well as damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for allegedly violating the
tribe's Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable search and
seizure. The U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California
granted the county's motion to dismiss the tribe's complaint. In relevant part the district court held that
the county district attorney and
county sheriff could not be sued in
their official capacities because they
had acted as state officials rather
than county officials when they
secured and executed the search
warrant against the tribe and hence
were not "persons" subject to damages liability under § 1983. The
court held further that the county
district attorney and county sheriff
had qualified immunity from suit in
their personal capacities because
their conduct did not violate any
clearly established statutory or constitutional right of the tribe. Finally,
the court rejected the tribe's claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief
for an alleged ongoing breach of
tribal sovereign immunity because,
in the court's view, a proper analysis
of tribal sovereign immunity necessitated a judicial balancing of interests in which the county's interest
in preventing welfare fraud outweighed the tribe's interest in protecting its right to self-governance.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant
part. The court held that the county

district attorney and county sheriff
violated the tribe's sovereign immunity-whether conceptualized as a
product of interest balancing or
application of a per se rule-by
obtaining and executing a search
warrant against the tribe and its
property. The court held further
that by violating the tribe's sovereign immunity, the county district
attorney and county sheriff, as well
as the county itself, were liable for
damages under § 1983 because (1)
the county district attorney and
county sheriff had acted as county
officers rather than state officers
when they executed the warrant
against the tribe, and (2) the county
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity since they knew or
should have known that executing
the warrant in disregard of tribal
sovereign immunity violated the
tribe's clearly established constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. After the Ninth
Circuit denied Inyo County's petition for rehearing en bane, the
Supreme Court granted its petition
for certiorari, limiting review to the
issues of (1) whether executing the
search warrant violated tribal sovereign immunity; (2) whether such
violation is actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) whether
the doctrine of qualified immunity
shields the county district attorney
and county sheriff from § 1983
liability.
CASE ANALYSIS
California, in which Inyo County
and the Bishop Paiute Reservation
are located and in which the
allegedly illegal search and seizure
of tribal property took place, is a socalled Public Law 280 state. Public
Law 280 was enacted in 1953 as a
centerpiece of Congress's then-prevailing "termination" policy, under
which Congress sought to extinguish
the United States government's
longstanding trust obligations
(Continued on Page 370)
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toward Indian tribes and Indian
people. Although Congress eventually repudiated termination (replacing
it with a general policy of supporting tribal sovereignty and self-determination), Public Law 280 has not
been repealed but instead continues
to function as a limited grant of governmental authority to certain
states over Indians in Indian country. As one of six "mandatory"
Public Law 280 states, California
thus is federally authorized to
enforce its criminal laws against
individual Indians even with respect
to crimes alleged to have taken
place on tribal land within the
boundaries of an Indian reservation.
In the proceedings below, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Inyo County's argument that Public Law 280 effected a
congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, and the briefs of the
parties and their amici before the
Supreme Court reflect the county's
apparent abandonment of this waiver theory. Such a theory would be
difficult to reconcile with a unanimous 1976 Supreme Court decision
narrowly construing Congress's
grant of governmental authority to
the states under Public Law 280 and
observing that although the statute
subjects individual Indians to state
criminal jurisdiction, "there is
notably absent any conferral of state
jurisdiction over the tribes themselves... "Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373, 389 (1975).
Accordingly, the county now argues
that irrespective of Public Law 280,
an Indian tribe does not possess
sovereign immunity shielding the
tribe from execution of a state
search warrant issued for the purpose of investigating an alleged
crime otherwise within the state's
criminal jurisdiction, even when the
investigation entails entering tribally owned land within reservation
boundaries without the tribe's consent and forcibly seizing property
owned by the tribal government

itself. Alternatively, the county
argues that even if the Bishop
Paiute Tribe possesses sovereign
immunity from compulsory statecourt process, the tribe is entitled
only to injunctive relief and not
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because (1) the statute does not
apply in this case, and (2) the county officials enjoy qualified immunity
from suit.
At the core of this dispute is a disagreement concerning the existence, nature, and scope of tribal
sovereign immunity as a bar to
compulsory state-court process in
Indian country. The tribe maintains-and the Ninth Circuit heldthat under established decisions of
the Supreme Court and settled principles of Indian law, Indian tribes as
sovereign governments are immune
from judicial process absent a waiver of immunity by Congress or the
tribes themselves. The tribe relies
on a series of Supreme Court decisions consistently affirming tribal
immunity from state-court orders,
including the most recent such decision, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,
523 U.S. 751 (1998). In Kiowa
Tribe, the Court held that tribal sovereign immunity shielded an Indian
tribe from a commercial contract
suit brought in state court, even
though the contract was executed
off-reservation. Although the Court
expressed some concern about "perpetuating the doctrine," it intimated
that the decision whether tribal
immunity should be limited or otherwise altered is best left to
Congress since "Congress is in a
position to weigh and accommodate
the competing policy concerns and
reliance interests." Id. at 759. The
Bishop Paiute Tribe further argues
that Kiowa Tribe's concern about
"tribal immunity extend[ing]
beyond what is necessary to safeguard tribal self-governance," id. at
758, is inapplicable to the present
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dispute since this case does not
involve "purely off-reservation conduct ... that has no meaningful
nexus to the tribe's land or its sovereign functions," id. at 764
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Urging reversal of the Ninth
Circuit's decision, Inyo County
argues that tribal sovereign immunity consists exclusively of immunity
from civil suit and does not include
immunity from "the execution of
process relating to off-reservation
violations of state law." Pet. Br. at
32. The tribe counters that under
established principles, sovereign
immunity protects "the operations
of governments and their property
from any legal process to which the
sovereign has not given its consent."
Resp. Br. at 18. The tribe asserts
that the Supreme Court's Indian law
and sovereign immunity jurisprudence has never recognized the
dichotomy between civil and criminal cases advocated by the county,
adding that "[florcible execution of
a search warrant, to which a tribe
has no opportunity to object, is
even more invasive of tribal sovereignty than a civil subpoena or discovery request which a tribe can
oppose, or than civil litigation
against it which a tribe can move to
dismiss." Resp. Br. at 22.
By arguing that sovereign immunity
does not encompass freedom from
"the execution of process relating to
off-reservation violations of state
law," the county apparently
assumes that any welfare fraud
found to exist in this case properly
would be classified as an "off-reservation violation" of state law.
Although this assumption has utility
in bolstering the county's further
argument that tribal sovereign
immunity "infringes on the retained
sovereign rights of the states" (since
states' on-reservation criminal jurisdiction over Indians exists solely by
virtue of a federal statute), Pet. Br.
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at 34, it is unclear whether this
assumption is valid or appropriate
when the reservation as logically
may be regarded as the situs of the
alleged welfare fraud and when
Public Law 280 has extended the
state's criminal jurisdiction to the
on-reservation conduct of individual
Indians in any event. The county
also argues that because its search
warrant was in the form of a directive addressed solely to county officials, the warrant "did not command the [tribe] to affirmatively do
anything" and hence the present
dispute is distinguished from prior
cases in which the Supreme Court
has upheld tribal sovereign immunity as protecting tribes from "being
haled coercively into court for the
purpose of being required to
respond to a claim of civil liability.
..." Pet. Br. at 34.
A more involved argument advanced
by Inyo County is that an Indian
tribe's retained inherent sovereignty
is not infringed by subjecting the
tribal government and the tribe's
own property within reservation
boundaries to coercive search and
seizure pursuant to a state-court
search warrant issued for facilitating
an investigation relating to an
alleged off-reservation crime. In
making this argument the county
relies primarily on Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353 (2001), and assumes
once again that the welfare fraud
alleged in this case properly may be
classified as an alleged off-reservation crime. In Hicks, the Supreme
Court held that an Indian tribe has
no power to adjudicate civil claims
brought against state officials for
conduct occurring in the course of
executing a search warrant against
an individual tribal member and his
on-reservation property for an
alleged off-reservation crime.
Although the issue in Hicks was one
of tribal governmental authority
over state officials who were not

tribal members (rather than state
authority over the tribe itself), the
Hicks Court adopted a mode of
analysis that entailed an inquiry
into whether tribal power to regulate the conduct of nonmember
state officials was necessary to protect the tribe's right to govern itself
and control its internal relations.
Importing the classic test for determining whether an assertion of state
authority in Indian county
"infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them," Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), the
Hicks Court stated that Nevada's
interest in executing a search warrant against a tribal member and his
property for an alleged off-reservation crime was "considerable" and
hence declared that "tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state law is
not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations....
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
.Describing Hicks as "strikingly similar" to the present case, Pet. Br. at
29, Inyo County insists that the fact
that the present dispute involves a
search warrant executed against a
tribal government and the tribe's
own property does not distinguish
Hicks-i.e., that the balancing of
competing interests under the
infringement test of Williams v. Lee
in this case once again justifies permitting compulsory state judicial
process within reservation boundaries as a tool for enforcing substantive criminal law otherwise within
the state's jurisdiction.
The tribe, on the other hand, argues
that Hicks does not control the present dispute because longstanding
principles of Indian law compel the
conclusion that tribal self-government is clearly infringed when a
state search warrant is forcibly executed against a tribal government or

tribal property (as distinguished
from an individual tribal member's
person or property). The Ninth
Circuit had so held, concluding that
"even if a balancing test is the
appropriate legal framework" (as
opposed to the "more categorical
approach" reflected in the Supreme
Court's tribal sovereign immunity
cases), "the balance of interests
favors a ruling for the Tribe." Bishop
Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291
F.3d 549, 559 (9th Cir. 2002).
Consistent with the reasoning of the
court of appeals, the tribe argues
that the search warrant in this case
transgressed the tribe's right to govern itself and control its internal
relations "by disrupting the Tribe's
ability to control access to its confidential records and operate a vital
enterprise on its reservation pursuant to its confidentiality policies."
Resp. Br. at 26. The tribe further
argues that the county had alternatives at its disposal for obtaining the
records that would have avoided a
confrontation with the tribe and a
forcible violation of the tribe's right
of self-government.
Countering the county's reliance on
Nevada v. Hicks, the tribe argues
that Hicks "is fully consistent with
protecting the tribe from the state
court warrant in this case" and that
Hicks indeed "reinforces that tribes
retain inherent authority 'necessary
to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations."' Resp.
Br. at 34 (quoting Hicks, 533 U.S. at
359). The tribe observes that none
of the 19th-century cases invoked in
Hicks for recognizing a limited ability of the states to serve process
within reservation boundariesUnited States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886); Utah & Northern
Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28
(1885); and Fort Leavenworth
Railway Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525
(1885)-permitted interference with
tribal governments and tribal prop(Continued on Page 372)
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erty or otherwise "undermine[d] the
longstanding rule guarding the right
of a tribe, as a government, to be
free from state intrusion." Resp. Br.
at 34 n.24. The United States as
amicus supports the tribe on this
crucial issue, stating that the Hicks
Court "did not suggest that either
Utah & Northern or Kagama would
support the issuance of state
process running against the Tribe
itself or calling for the seizure of
property belonging to the Tribe."
United States Br. at 19. The tribe
argues further that Hicks is distinguished because as the Court noted,
that case dealt primarily with tribal
authority over "a narrow category of
outsiders," Hicks, 533 U.S. at 371,
and did not directly address the
issue of a tribe's power to govern
itself and its internal relations in the
face of coercive assertions of state
authority applied directly against
the tribal government and tribal
property.
A highly contentious issue
addressed at length by the parties
and all anici is whether enforcing
state-court process against tribal
governments and their property is
necessary to prevent Indian reservations from devolving into sanctuaries for harboring criminals and sheltering evidence of off-reservation
crime. Inyo County raises the
specter of such enclaves of lawlessness in a series of imaginative "what
if" scenarios:
What if the recent Washington
D.C. area sniper suspects had
taken refuge in a tribal hotel or
casino? What if a solo or serial
murderer or rapist, child molester, money launderer, drug dealer,
or other perpetrator of state
crime seeks refuge for himself or
the bounty of evidence of his
crime in tribal hotels, resorts, or
casinos, or within the acreage of
tribal casinos or tribal motocross,
RV, or other parks? State search
and arrest warrants will be mean-

ingless and useless in the search
for the suspects, and in searching
for the bounty of evidence and
instrumentalities of crime-making state sovereignty and state
law enforcement activities regarding investigation and prosecution
of off-reservation state crimes
against our citizens subject to the
approval of a multitude of various
tribal governments....
Pet. Br. at 23-24.
Although the county does not
explain how these scenarios relate
to the county's specific legal arguments, presumably they are pressed
either as concerns to be taken into
account in judicially modifying
criminal law enforcement policy in
Indian country or as factors to be
considered in weighing the state's
interests against the tribe's under
the Williams v. Lee test for determining whether the search warrant
in this case infringed on tribal selfgovernment.
The tribe and numerous amiciincluding the states of New Mexico,
Arizona, Montana, and
Washington-vigorously deny the
accuracy of the county's depiction
of Indian reservations as potential
havens of criminal activity and lawlessness. The tribe argues that the
existing comprehensive framework
of federal, state, and tribal law
enforcement on Indian reservations
"preclude[s] any danger that reservations could become havens for
criminals or criminal activity"
and posits that "[i]f any changes
in this framework should become
necessary, these should be made
by Congress." Resp. Br. at 41. An
amicus brief submitted by the

National Congress of American
Indians, the National Indian Gaming
Association, and 17 tribes asserts
that the county's argument is based
on "the stereotypical and entirely
unsupported premise that, absent
the specter of state coercion, Tribes
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will willingly harbor criminals and
conceal evidence," NCAI et al. Br. at
7, and provides numerous examples
of tribal-state law enforcement partnerships, extradition codes, and
cooperative agreements that contribute to comprehensive law
enforcement in Indian country.
Likewise, the brief for the states of
New Mexico, Arizona, Montana, and
Washington notes that those states
"prefer to cooperate with tribes and
work together in a mutually respectful, government-to-government relationship" and "do not want the
Court to be misled by the
Petitioners as to the state of law
enforcement on Indian lands."
New Mexico et al. Br. at 1, 5.
The final overarching issue in dispute is whether any breach of the
tribe's sovereign immunity would
subject the county to damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
county alleges multiple errors in the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the
tribe was entitled to such damages.
First, the county argues that the
tribe is not a "person" within the
meaning of the statute's language
rendering eligible for compensatory
relief "any citizens of the United
States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof." The tribe
counters that the issue of whether
the tribe is a "person" was not
raised in the proceedings below and
thus is not properly before the
Court. The tribe also challenges the
county's reliance on cases addressing whether states are covered by
the language of § 1983 and observes
that the statute's legislative history
"gives no indication that Congress
intended to exclude Indian tribes
from the category of 'persons' capable of bringing an action under the
Act." Resp. Br. at 43.
The county next argues that the
tribe has failed to allege any Fourth
Amendment violation actionable
under § 1983. The county asserts

Issue No. 6

that a breach of tribal sovereign
immunity is not equivalent to a constitutionally impermissible search
and seizure and that no "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known," Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999),
are at issue in this case to make the
county liable in damages, in part
because no case has held that
Indian tribes are included within
the meaning of "the people" as used
in the Fourth Amendment or "person" as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The tribe responds
that the Ninth Circuit was correct
in concluding that the county had
violated the tribe's constitutional
rights because in executing the
search warrant the county had acted beyond its jurisdiction, and
hence its search and seizure of the
tribe's property were "unreasonable" with the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The tribe also
urges the Court to reject the county's argument that Indian tribes are
outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment term "the people"
because the county failed to raise
that issue in the proceedings below
and thus the issue is not properly
before the Court. Moreover, the
tribe argues that "infringement of
the Tribe's right to self-government
and its sovereign immunity are
rights under the Constitution and
laws of the United States enforceable under Section 1983." Resp. Br.
at 46.
Finally, the county argues that compensatory relief under § 1983 is not
available to the tribe because the
county officials have qualified
immunity from suit. The county
urges the Court to reverse the Ninth
Circuit's contrary holding on this
issue, insisting that at the time the
search warrant was executed, a reasonable county official could not
have known the search was unlawful. The county relies on a passage

from Nevada v. Hicks indicating
that prior to that decision in June
2001, it "was not entirely clear"
whether states' off-reservation criminal jurisdiction gave rise to a
"'corollary right" of states to execute
compulsory process within reservation boundaries against individuals
accused of committing off-reservation crime. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
The tribe responds that the Ninth
Circuit was correct in concluding
that at the time the search was executed, the law concerning tribal sovereign immunity was "clearly established," and hence the county district attorney and county sheriff had
"fair warning" of the tribe's rights
and accordingly are ineligible for
qualified immunity. Resp. Br. at 4849. The tribe notes that its attorney
had advised the county district
attorney of the county's lack of
jurisdiction at the time the search
was forcibly executed, and that less
intrusive alternatives were available
for the county to obtain the information it sought without violating
the tribe's sovereignty.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case is being closely watched
because it cuts to the heart of one
of the most essential principles of
Indian law-federal protection of
sovereign tribal governments and
their property from state intrusion.
The foundational case of Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832),
resoundingly affirmed the federal
government's role in safeguarding
Indian tribes and their reserved territories from invasion and dispossession by the states, declaring that
Georgia law had no application
whatsoever within the territorial
boundaries of the Cherokee Nation.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in
Worcester expressly rejected the
argument that total and absolute
exclusion of state law and process
within the boundaries of an Indian
reservation effected a "usurpation"
of inherent state sovereignty, id.at

558, and this holding casts considerable doubt on suggestions
advanced by Inyo County and its
ainici that California has a sovereign right to execute a search warrant within the boundaries of the
Bishop Paiute Reservation.
Although limited exceptions to
Worcester's total exclusion of state
authority in Indian country have
been recognized by the Supreme
Court over the years, the Court
repeatedly has affirmed the nation's
deeply rooted "policy of leaving
Indians free from state jurisdiction
and control," Rice v. Olson, 324
U.S. 786 (1945), by resolving conflicts over governmental authority in
Indian country in a manner consistent with that historic policy in the
absence of countermanding congressional policy to the contrary.
Indeed, in what is widely regarded
as its first modern Indian law case,
the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Lee reiterated that "the basic policy
of Worcester has remained," 358
U.S. 212, 219 (1959), and subsequent cases-most notably those
affirming tribal sovereign immunity-likewise reflect the Court's continuing adherence to the policy of
insulating sovereign Indian tribes
and their reservations from the
intrusion of state law.
The present case tests whether the
Supreme Court will continue adhering to its historic policy of protecting tribal governments from state
intrusion in the face of arguments
about the states' need to coercively
penetrate the sovereignty of Indian
tribes in order to prevent Indian
reservations from becoming a refuge
for criminals and havens of lawlessness. While Nevada v. Hicks
appears to countenance execution
of state-court search warrants
against individual tribal members
and their property within reservation boundaries to facilitate police
(Continued oni Page 374)
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investigations into allegations of offreservation crime, there are indications in Hicks itself that the Court
would not be inclined to extend that
decision to grant states the authority to disrupt tribal governments and
seize tribal property. It would be
incongruous, for instance, for the
Court to deny the tribe federal court
relief in this case when Hicks partially justified its denial of tribal
court authority over state officials
accused of violating a tribal member's rights on tribal land by pointing out that federal courts are available for redressing such violations.
Moreover, despite the Court's unanimity on the narrow issue of the
tribal court's jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court justices in Hicks
were divided as to whether a proper
balancing of interests had been conducted in concluding that the state's
interest in enforcing its off-reservation criminal law outweighed the
tribe's interest in ensuring that tribal members and their property within reservation boundaries are free
from the imposition of state-court
process. Presumably, those justices
concerned about whether the Hicks
majority had imposed a per se rule
favoring the state under the guise of
pursuing a balancing inquiry would
have even greater cause for concern
if tribal interests were disregarded
in the present case, in which
California's avowed interest in maintaining law and order on Indian
reservations is rebutted by other
states and in view of the fact that
the Court itself consistently has protected Indian tribes under a categorical rule of tribal sovereign immunity from being coercively subjected
to state-court process.

Paiute Tribe and Inyo County to
revitalize the foundational principles of Indian law by reaffirming
limits on the imposition of state law
against tribal governments and tribal property within reservation
boundaries.
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Thus despite Indian tribes' fears
that the Supreme Court's decision
in this case may strike another
severe blow to tribal sovereignty,
the Court instead may use the present dispute between the Bishop
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